I’m still looking into the suspicious Laxsson crypto project that I previously flagged as likely being a ponzi scam. To get definitive proof whether Laxsson is deceiving investors, I decided to dive into tracking their money flow on the blockchain.
The transaction histories recorded permanently on blockchains often expose shady behavior if you follow where the money is really coming from and going. I can use blockchain explorers to trace how Laxsson moves funds between wallets and users on the backend.
Usually with ponzi schemes, the money trail reveals newer investors’ funds being siphoned to pay off earlier participants. The blockchain doesn’t lie, so analyzing Laxsson’s transactions can prove if they’re playing tricks with people’s money behind the scenes.
In this report, I’ll document my in-depth tracking of Laxsson’s wallets and transactions. By examining where the money comes in and goes back out, I aim to conclusively show whether Laxsson is simply running a fraudulent ponzi taking from newer users to keep older users happy. Let’s zoom in on the money flow and see what shakes out
Starting the analysis, I began tracing Laxsson’s web of wallet addresses to map where funds were coming from and ultimately ending up.
I discovered a few USDT wallet addresses that seemed to be aggregators, gathering many small amounts from users. These then transferred lump sums to several larger wallets apparently used to distribute funds.
Some of the bigger recipient wallets would divide up profits, likely making payments to earlier investors to keep up appearances. Other wallet addresses routed large amounts directly to exchanges – likely cashing out funds for the scheme organizers.
Laxsson appeared to use temporary wallet addresses that would collect money before rapidly sending it along to their core wallets. This laundering through multiple wallets obscures the money trail, but the blockchain tells all.
The pathway showed clear signs of gathering funds from regular users and quickly funneling crypto out to payoff early adopters and extract payouts. This money flow confirms deceptive ponzi activity paying existing users with new money and washing some of them for themselves.
Here is an example of how we can analyze the process from blockchain explorers and wallets they used to gather funds from investors.
First, we identified a wallet address that Laxsson owned, which people confirmed transferring money to. Looking at this wallet, we uncovered interesting insights about the project (archive)
This Laxsson-owned wallet had total inflows and outflows of around $1.5 million. Midway through the trail, they utilized Allchainbridge to obfuscate the money flow by exchanging USDT for another cryptocurrency. Some branches of the trail terminated at Binance, likely indicating cashing out of funds.
Analyzing the outflows from the previous Laxsson wallet, we uncovered another associated wallet that had a net flow of $2.43 million when discovered. The money laundering method matched the earlier wallet. (archive)
Further down the chain, we reached a wallet with a net flow of $3.5 million at the time, though it did not route to any exchanges. This wallet appeared to return money into the network, likely paying out investors or scheme organizers. (archive).
Continuing on, we found another wallet exhibiting the same money laundering behaviors.
In total, we traced 36 connected Laxsson wallets showing a net flow of $357 million. Of that amount, over $42 million ended up at cryptocurrency bridges or exchanges, indicating likely cashing out of funds.
The net flow observed across the 36 wallets may not represent the full scope of this ponzi network’s activity. It likely only exposes a portion of the total funds that flowed through this operation in its 8 month lifespan.
However, mapping even this subset of connected wallets provides insight into how massive and extensive a crypto ponzi system can become. The true total dollar amount that flowed through the full Laxsson scam is probably far greater than what we were able to trace through this limited wallet analysis.
Another interesting part of exploring through the blockchain network for Laxsson is we found out that some of those wallets they used to spread and wash funds with are the same as another ponzi scheme that recently exit scammed named: ITP Corp (archive)
Intelligent Technology Pioneer Corporation or ITP Corp (ITP Pro), itpro[.]top is another scam project with promises of daily returns from investments.. (archive)
These two projects have almost everything in common from login pages to wallet structures and washing methods. They both used an Asian platform for their web applications. based on Behind MLM Research they probably operating from Asian Countries.
From these similarities, we can see that whoever is behind Laxsson is likely the same entity behind ITP Corp as well and it may suggest that they are both run by Asians (China, Hong Kong or Singapore ).
We all dream of getting rich quick, but unbelievable promises are usually too good to be true. Getting wealthy takes patience and hard work – no shortcuts. Stay smart out there, avoid anything suspicious, and never give your money to some stranger selling the world. Use your head and you can steer clear of these traps. Thanks for reading.
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